Nietzsche thinks that for us moderns existence often assumes the site of a tragic equivocation, structured as it is by an antinomy of fate and freedom. 5 The sovereign individual is depicted by Nietzsche as an agent that has an awareness (the conscience) of power and freedom; it is master of a "free will" (the power to make an independent decision, BGE 208); it has an "enduring, unbreakable will" and "its own standard of value", and is "strong enough to stand upright in the face of fate" (Schicksal) (note: it does not conquer fate which is impossible) (GM II. 2). In a notebook from 1873-4 he says that the aim of wisdom is "to enable a human being to face all the blows of fate (Schicksalsschläge) with equal firmness, to arm him for all times" (KSA 7, 30 [25] ).
Let me note two important points at the outset: (a) for Nietzsche it is not simply a question, in searching for one"s authentic self, of pitting a raw or pure, uncultivated self against culture and cultivation. The self is not, or not simply, the irrational other of civilisation. Neither is it simply the effected discontent or malcontent of the repressive discipline of civilisation. Rather, for Nietzsche we need to think of a struggle between different kinds of cultivation and education, between the falseness of our present cultivation and education which produce only the "cultivated philistine" and genuine forms that would aim to promote "genius" and inspired by "greatness"; (b) second, the self for Nietzsche denotes not an interiority;
rather, it would be better to conceive it as bound up with actions and events, something that, as opposed to an inwardness, is "upwards and outwards". This is not the self as we perhaps typically construe it as some core essence which is then actualised as it lives and moves forward in time. Neither is it the self Hume criticizes which vaporises as soon as we try to grasp it and get hold of it. There is a kind of "core" for Nietzsche but this is simply the potential for a self. Nietzsche"s self is the product of both nature (physis) and culture.
In Nietzsche philosophy"s therapeutic function and role is tied to the need for a genuine paedeia or education. He argues against a certain idea of education and cultivation, one that produces the "cultivated philistine", and in favour of one which centres on culture conceived as transfigured physis. Therapy is needed because of the falseness of the present age. The so-called "cultivated person" is the enemy of cultivation because of his pernicious mendacity which denies the general malaise that characterises the present age and "thereby interferes with the work of physicians" (UO III 4): "To be cultivated now means "not to let others notice how wretched and base one is" (ibid 6). The cultural philistine is defined as "the quickly dated up-to-date babbler about the state, the church, and art" who has an insatiable stomach but knows little of genuine hunger and thirst (UO II 10).
The fact that Nietzsche links philosophy"s therapeia with paideia makes his position close to Plato"s, and the influence of Plato is at its strongest in his early writings. Plato"s decision to abandon a political career and pursue philosophy instead was motivated by the need to discover a cure, a therapeia, for immoralism and social disintegration (Cushman 2002, p. 295) . Like Plato, Nietzsche holds that philosophy should "concentrate" the human being in order to stabilise its apprehension of reality (he is unsure whether philosophy can do this today (KSA 7, 29 [211] ; see also
Cushman on Plato, 2002, p. 56). Of course, Nietzsche differs markedly from Plato in not conceiving the goal as one of contemplation of the form or idea of the Good (which is not identical with reality but beyond it, the "cause" of knowledge and truth and higher than both, The Republic 508a-509c); rather, the task is to "hold on to the sublime" in the sense of having belief in the eternal return of "possibilities of life" and committing oneself to the search for greatness in thought and life. Nietzsche notes that the concept of greatness is amorphous, being partly aesthetic and partly moral. For Nietzsche the great is that which departs from the normal and the familiar: "We venerate what is great. To be sure, that is also the abnormal" ( KSA 7, 19[80] ). He is insistent that philosophy needs to resist the "blind power of facts" and "the tyranny of the real" (UO II 8) and focus its vision on the superior forms of human existence. For
Nietzsche philosophy entails the legislation of greatness, conceived as a "namegiving" that elevates (erhebt) the human being, and it has its origins in the legislation of morality (Gesetzgebung der Moral) (KSA 7, 19[83] ). It is this conception of philosophy Nietzsche returns to in his late writings. In Beyond Good and Evil, for example, philosophy is defined as "spiritual perception" (or vision) (BGE 252), which in Twilight of the Idols is clarified as "the power (Macht) of philosophical vision (Blick)" that is able to judge in all the most important matters and does not hide under the mask of objectivity (TI IX, 3).
II: The Historical Malady
In the untimely meditation on history Nietzsche addresses the sickness of his age and names it "the historical malady". The illness consists in an excess of history and a misguided historical cultivation. The modern age is in the grip of a historical fever.
The cure consists in subjecting "science" and the quest of knowledge to the supervision of a higher power which he calls "the hygiene of life". The task is to determine the value and goal of the knowing of science (Wissenschaft). Not every form of life or society that comes into existence can be considered worthy of existence, and yet the tendency of history is to make everything that does come into existence appear rational and purposive. History should speak of what is great and unique, of the exemplary model (KSA 7, 19 [10] ).
The antidotes to the stifling of life by the historical are the "ahistorical" and the "suprahistorical"; these are viewed as poisons from the perspective of Wissenschaft.
Nietzsche seeks to trump this viewpoint, however, when he proposes that it is a lack of science that allows them to be viewed as poisons and not as remedies, and this is because a branch of science still remains to be developed: "a kind of higher hygiene that examines the effects of science on life and determines the permitted amount from the standpoint of the health of a people or of a culture" (UO II 10 & KSA 7, 29 [194] ).
The ahistorical designates forgetting and illusion and allows the self to be enclosed within a limited horizon. The suprahistorical has a soothing and diverting effect, encouraging us to divert our gaze from what is in the process of becoming. Together the two work to free us from the tyranny of the actual and to counter any idolatry of success. Nietzsche acknowledges that we may suffer from the proposed antidotes, though he sees no good reason as to why this should call into question the correctness of the chosen therapy. We will suffer from them because there can be no guarantee of future health and cheerfulness. We can only appeal to the aspiration we might have for them.
Nietzsche borrows the notion of "weak personality" from the Austrian dramatist and critic Franz Grillparzer (1791-1872) (see KSA 7, 29 [68] . It refers to a human being that has developed the habit of no longer taking real things seriously. 6 What is real and existent makes only a slight impression on such a personality who becomes more and more negligent and indolent with respect to outward things. It is content so long as its memory is repeatedly stimulated anew, "as long as new things worthy of knowing, which can be neatly placed in the pigeonholes of that memory, keep streaming in (UO II 5). The human being becomes a strolling spectator of life living in the midst of a cosmopolitan carnival of gods, arts, and customs. Great wars and revolutions can hardly detain such a human for more than a fleeting moment.
Moreover, war seems to only exist for the sake of history and the journalism that consumes it. We want only more history and never real events. Nietzsche expresses it morally (moralisch): we are no longer capable of holding onto the sublime (das Erhabene festzuhalten) because our deeds are merely sudden claps (Schläge) of thunder and not rolling thunder (ibid.). The chief danger of allowing ourselves to be ruled by a historical, ironical sensibility is that we have no sense of the possibility of our having our own distinct voice and destiny (see Gemes 2001, p. 347). If we are not strong or confident enough to take ourselves as the measure of the past, and no longer trust ourselves, then we turn to history for advice and eventually become actors out of timorousness and play a role, in fact, many roles (UO II 5; see also UO I 10).
Art and religion are important tools for Nietzsche by which we can take possession of ourselves and organize the "chaos" within us, so discovering what our genuine needs are (UO II 10). The aim is to do this in a way which does not make us fear cultivation or respond to the summons to become the ones that we are in a brooding manner: religion "provides love for the human being", art the "love for existence" (KSA 7, 29 [192] ). 7 Whereas the ahistorical provides the vapour or atmosphere in which every great his event is born, the suprahistorical standpoint cures us of the (Hegelian) fashion of taking history too seriously. Nietzsche recognises, however, that the suprahistorical carries a danger, that of leading us away from action altogether and experiencing nausea at existence (as happens in Schopenhauer"s philosophy). The suprahistorical is the attitude which holds that the past and the present are one and the same, and this means that history teaches us nothing new but only gives us the appearance of difference. It thus requires a careful cultivation and needs to work in concert with the positive uses to which history can be put.
For Nietzsche the value of philosophy lies in its purifying tasks, such as cleansing muddled and superstitious ideas. To this extent it is a science, but to the extent that it is at the same time anti-scientific -for example in opposing scientific dogmatism (what today we would call scientism) -it is "religious-obscurantist" (KSA 7, 24 [10] ). Philosophy opposes the fixed value of ethical concepts and the hatred of the body. It shows us what is anthropomorphic: the translation of the world into the care or concern of the human being. Philosophy is harmful since it dissolves instinct, cultures, and customary moralities. In terms of the present, philosophy encounters the absence of a popular ethic, the absence of any sense of the importance of discriminating, a mania for history, and so on. In the case of the philosopher we have a physician -the physician of culture -who must heal himself (ibid. 29 [213] ). This is because, according to Nietzsche, the philosopher must first become a thinker for himself before he can educate others (see also Z "On the Bestowing Virtue" for the same idea).
Schopenhauer provides the lesson needed here of achieving independence in relation to the present age (UO III 3). Nietzsche thinks this is an especially pressing task for the thinker today that is faced with the claims of a "new age" (Neuzeit) (UO II 8). 8 The problem with the present is that it is "importunate" (zudringlich), being something that is always unintentionally overvalued. This is especially felt by the philosopher, says Nietzsche, whose peculiar task is to be the lawgiver of "the measure, mint, and weight of things" (ibid.). The philosopher seeks to pronounce a judgment that is valid for the "entire fate of humanity", that is "the highest fate" (Loos) that can befall an individual human being or an entire people and not just the average fate (ibid.).
The task is to examine how things look with regard to the health and sickness of one"s age, but "who is physician enough to know this?", Nietzsche asks. The problem for our age is the esteem accorded to the scholar since the scholar shows no awareness of the goal of genuine culture. In relation to science, philosophy draws attention to its barbarizing effects, that is, the fact that it so easily loses itself in the service of practical interests. The "laisser aller" (let it go) attitude of modern science resembles the dogmas of political economy: it has a naïve faith in an absolutely beneficial result. In addition, it employs artistic powers in an effort to break the unlimited knowledge-drive and in order to produce a unity of knowledge. then, "eternal becoming is a deceitful puppet play over which human beings forget themselves", and for whom the "heroism of truthfulness consists in one day ceasing to be its plaything" (UO III 4). If everything that "is" finds itself caught up in the process of becoming, and this becoming is "empty, deceitful, flat", worthy only of our lofty contempt, then the riddle presented to the human being to solve can be solved only in being (ibid.).
Given that Nietzsche also aspires to be unfashionable, and given that meaning and value are not to be located for him in a process of history or evolution, how will he avoid the temptation of being and resist Schopenhauer"s solution to the problem of existence? We tend to conceive this in terms of Nietzsche expressing an affirmation of life, and such an affirmation is indeed signalled in Schopenhauer as Educator and as something metaphysical. This is used not in a pejorative sense by Nietzsche, rightly so, but indicates the fact that the affirmation which is profound is "of another,
higher life" and at the cost of the "destruction and violation of the laws of this life": only in this way can the affirmation be untimely or unfashionable (UO III 4). Unlike
Schopenhauer, then, Nietzsche has belief in the future and new life.
The notion of purification (Reinigung) runs throughout Nietzsche"s corpus and plays an important role in the unfashionable observations. Nietzsche is appealing to a desire to render ourselves pure and clean, and solitude is essential to this task.
However, whilst solitude may be a sublime need (BGE 284), it is never promoted by
Nietzsche as end in itself or a means of retreat (GM II 24). Schopenhauer purified and healed his own being, knowing that there are higher and purer things on earth to discover than what is offered to us by a fashionable life (UO III 3; see also GS 99). In the fourth observation on Wagner Nietzsche construes music as the purification and transformation of nature into love, which is the enemy of convention and all "artificial alienation" and unintelligibility between human beings (UO IV 5). In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche draws attention to tragedy"s power to stimulate, purify, and discharge the life of a people and "as the essence of all prophylactic energies", acting as a mediator between the strongest and most fateful qualities of a people (BT 21).
Nietzsche knows well, of course, the importance placed on purification in Greek thought. In his lectures on the pre-Platonics he notes that figures such as Xenophanes
and Empedocles aimed at a purification of humanity. Although it is not the sole use to which he puts it, in Nietzsche"s thinking the principal stress is on purification as means to self-legislation. In Plato katharsis brings about the deliverance of the soul from the deceits of the realm of sense and attendant passions of the body (Cushman 2002 , p. 56). In Nietzsche the aim is to purify ourselves of the stupidly or ineptly empirical in the name of the promise of future strong life. Nietzsche argues that the sense for "cleanliness" (Reinlichkeit) should be kindled in a child to the point of passion, attending all its talents "like an aureole of purity" that bears happiness within it and spreading happiness around it (AOM 288). In the discourse "On the Tree of the Mountainside" in Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche argues that the liberated in spirit still needs to purify itself since much "prison and mustiness" still resides in it.
Purification is necessary for new perception or vision: "his eye must yet become pure".
He sets incredibly high standards for the attainment of nobility and the creation of what is new and a new virtue. He repeats the dangers he had drawn attention to in the observations. The chief danger is not that the free in spirit might become a "good man", that is, one who wishes to preserve the old, but rather insolent and scornful, losing his highest hope and in the process slandering all and any such hopes. Those who preach rejection of life have failed to become properly human. 9 In GS 335 Nietzsche advises us as follows: "Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and valuations and to the creation our own new tables of what is good…" In SE this works as the "law" of the authentic self and higher life:
"your true being does not lie deeply hidden within you, but rather immeasurably high above you, or at least above what you commonly take to be your ego" (UO III 1). In SE it is the job of conscience to awaken the self to its task: ""Be yourself! You are none of those things that you now do, think, and desire"" (ibid.) In GS 335 it is the job of the "intellectual conscience", the superior form of conscience to the moral conscience, what Nietzsche calls the conscience behind our conscience. Whatever the name of this conscience, the end is the same: to become what one "is" where this refers to that which is "unique, singular, incomparable". However, one is not simply a lawgiver for the sake only of oneself. For Nietzsche an affirmation of life without the promise of a new culture is empty and vain.
Nietzsche makes this clear in his discussion of the dangers of uniqueness (Einzigkeit) in section 3 of SE. If we suppose, as Nietzsche does, that each individual bears within itself a "productive uniqueness as the kernel of its being", then this means that a strange aura -"the aura of the unusual" -surrounds it (UO III 3) This uniqueness is taken to be unbearable by many people since attached to it is a chain of efforts and burdens. The individual finds that the desert and the cave are always within it, so that solitude is given to it as a fate (Loos). Several dangers now confront this individual. First, there is the danger of pure science, in which one allows oneself to be educated by an "inhuman abstraction" (pure knowledge) and neglects the need for exemplars and models. Second, there is the danger of complexity: modern humans are so complex and many-sided that they become dishonest whenever they speak and try to act in accordance with their assertions. The task is to become "simple and honest in thought and life". Third, there is the danger of leading a ghostly life, obliged to live without courage or trust, in denial and doubt, agitated and discontented, always expecting to be disappointed: "No dog would go on living like this". Finally,
there is the danger of petrifaction: one is reduced to ruin by one"s uniqueness when it becomes an icy rock.
Nietzsche recognizes that it is necessary to indicate how the Schopenhauerean- When thinking about individuals and the role they play in the circle of culture,
Nietzsche"s focus is on the longing for the "whole". Our longing cannot simply be for our personal redemption but needs to turn outward in order to rediscover in the world the desire for culture which demands of us not only inner experiences, or even an assessment of the external world that surrounds us, but "ultimately and primarily action; that is, it demands he fights for culture and oppose those influences, habits, laws, and institutions in which he does not recognize his goal: the production of genius" (UO III 6). Whilst there may be an "unconscious purposiveness" at work in nature, the production of redeeming human beings cannot be left to chance and accident, to what Nietzsche at this time calls "the dark drive" (jenes 'dunklen Drangs') but must be replaced with a "conscious intention" (ibid.). This is on account of the fact that today we are ruled by a culture of power (Nietzsche refers to "the cultured state (Kulturstaat)") that misuses and exploits culture for perverted ends. The public, civil, or social life of the present age amounts to nothing more than an equilibrium of self-interests. It does well what it does, namely, answering the question of how to achieve a mediocre existence that lacks any power of love, and it does this simply through the prudence of the self-interests involved. The present is an age that hates art and hates religion: it wants neither the beyond nor the transfiguration of the world of art (KSA 7, 19[69] ). Science has become a source of nourishment for egoism and state and society have drafted it into their service in order to exploit it for their purposes. In order to promote a new seriousness in the face of these lamentable developments Nietzsche states the need for a fundamental alteration of the world through "images" that will make us shudder. The object of attack is "the perversity of contemporary human nature" and its subjection to misguided notions such as ""progress", "general education", "nationalism", "modern state", "cultural struggle"" (UO III 7).
(ii) Nietzsche on the "Self"
In Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche recognizes that authenticity requires a confrontation of the self with a task. He poses the question:
But how can we find ourselves again? How can the human being get to know himself? He is a dark and veiled thing; and if the hare has seven skins, the human being can shed seven skins seventy times and still not be able to say: "This is really you, this is no longer outer shell". Besides, it is an agonising, dangerous undertaking to dig down into yourself in this way, to force your way by the shortest route down the shaft of your own being. How easy it is to do damage to yourself that no doctor can heal" (UO III 1).
His concern is with how "the fundamental law of oneself" can be disclosed to us and his solution is ingenuous: "your true being does not lie hidden deeply within you, but rather immeasurably high above you, or at least above what you commonly take to be your ego" (ibid.).
There are steps to self-knowledge. An initial step is to ask oneself -what have I truly loved up to now? What has exalted my spirit? What has mastered it and blessed it? If I place before myself a series of such revered objects they may provide me, through their series and nature, with a set of clues into my "true self" and its law.
Although instructive and helpful, the challenge I place upon myself with these questions will only reveal part of what I need to know: namely, that there is something revealed to me in life that belongs to a superior order of being. Let us call it "sovereign" being, which refer to supreme peaks or achievements, and I have moments of perception when the things that are most worthy of value are judged. In a note of 1885 Nietzsche associates the name "Dionysus" with this kind of judgement:
"One has only to pronounce the word "Dionysus" in the presence of the best latter-day names and things, in the presence of Goethe perhaps, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or Raphael -at once we feel that our best things and moments have been judged" (KSA 11, 41 [7] ; WP 1051).
A stronger task consists in education since this is liberation, namely the removal of all weeds, rubble, and vermin that seeks to harm the plant"s delicate shoots.
Education is both imitation and perfection of nature: imitation where nature displays its maternal and merciful disposition; perfection when it prevents nature"s cruel and merciless onslaughts and turns them to good, "when it drapes a veil over the expression of nature"s stepmotherly disposition and sad lack of understanding" (UO III 1). Although this is not the only way of finding and coming to oneself, Nietzsche thinks it is an effective way: educators that we can identify with reveal to us the "primordial sense of basic stuff" of my being, something that is incapable of being educated or cultivated and which can only be liberated or set free (redeemed).
Every great philosophy makes a demand on us: ""This is the picture of life; learn from it the meaning of your life"". Conversely I can read my life and on the basis of it decipher the hieroglyphs of life in general. This twofold process is what Nietzsche sees in Schopenhauer as an educator: on the one hand, gaining insight into his own misery, need, and limitations which then acquaints him with consolations and antidotes (sacrifice of the ego, subjugation to the noblest intentions and deeds and to justice and compassion); on the other hand, enabling him to distinguish between genuine and merely apparent happiness, which is not to be attained through wealth, honour, or erudition. I recognise and can freely declare to myself that my individual existence appears and feels worthless and none of the aforementioned can lift me out of my depression. Rather, there is a need for a "lofty and transfiguring overarching purpose", and for Nietzsche this consists in attaining power (Macht) so as to come to the aid of physis and correct its stupidities and ineptitudes: "At first, of course, only for oneself; but through oneself, ultimately for all" (UO III 3).
The individual is important for Nietzsche and accorded, in contrast to Nietzsche"s conception of the self is that of the lawgiver who occupies a place in the "whole" and for this reason is something fateful. For this other self to come into being it is necessary to engage in the task of purification.
Nietzsche comes up with a deeper explanation for this idea of a "metaphysical" completion of nature, which centres on how we can think the human in its relation to the animal. On the one hand, the human feeds productively on its own animality (for example, animal vigour and the power of forgetting); on other hand, it enjoys a supreme advantage over the animal in that it is able to understand its existence metaphysically. The animal by contrast is the site of "senseless suffering" since it is subject to hunger and desires without having any insight into the nature of this mode of life:
To cling so blindly and madly to life, for no higher reward, far from knowing that one is punished or why one is punished in this way, but instead to thirst with the inanity of a horrible desire for precisely this punishment as though it were happiness -that is what it means to be an animal (UO III 5).
Although it is a speculative or supra-empirical claim to make, we can say that the human animal represents, at least potentially, the salvation of animal existence, in
which life itself appears "in its metaphysical meaninglessness" (ibid.). 12 Of course, in actuality it is difficult to know where the animal ceases and where the human begins, and many human beings do not transcend, for whatever reason, an animal existence.
The salvation of the animal is also the salvation of the human animal. Nietzsche readily acknowledges that for the greatest part of our lives most of us live the way of the animal, desiring with more awareness what the animal craves out of blind instinct (we call this a life of "happiness"). The "sublime" is the moment of perception or vision when we experience the elevation of the human beyond the merely animal, when life rises itself up through the conquering and overcoming of need and makes "the leap of joy". As he puts it in SE:
…there are moments when we understand this; then the clouds break and we perceive how we, along with all of nature, are pressing onward toward the human being as toward something that stands high above us. To build anew the laws of life and of behaviour -for this task our sciences of physiology, medicine, sociology, and solitude are not yet sure of themselves: and only from them can we can take the foundation-stones for new ideals (if not the new ideals themselves). Thus we are living either a preliminary or posterior existence, depending on taste and talent, and it is best in this interregnum to be to every possible extent our own reges and to found little experimental states. We are experiments: let is also want to be such! (D 453)
Dawn strikes me, at least in part, as a distinctly Epicurean moment in Nietzsche"s development. In the book Epicurus is portrayed as the enemy of the idea of punishments in Hell after death developed by numerous secret cults of in the Roman Empire and that was taken up by Christianity. 13 For Nietzsche the triumph of Epicurus"s teaching resounds most beautifully in the mouth of the sombre Roman
Lucretius but comes too early. Christianity takes over the belief in "subterranean terrors" under its special protection and this foray into heathendom enables it to carry the day over the popularity of the Mithras and Isis cults, winning to its side the rank of the timorous as the most zealous adherents of the new faith (Nietzsche notes that because of the extent of the Jews" attachment to life such an idea fell on barren ground). However, the teaching of Epicurus triumphs anew in the guise of modern science which has rejected "any other representation of death and any life beyond it" (D 72; see also 150). Nietzsche is keen to encourage human beings to cultivate an attitude towards existence in which they accept their mortality and attain a new serenity about their dwelling on the earth, to conquer unjustified fears, and to reinstitute the role played by chance and chance events in the world and in human existence (D 13, 33, 36). 14 Not only did Nietzsche at this time subscribe to much of the teaching of Epicurus on cosmology and philosophy, he was also inspired by
Epicurus"s conception of friendship and ideal of withdrawing from society and cultivating one"s own garden. 15 In a letter to Peter Gast of 1883 Nietzsche writes that Epicurus, "is the best negative argument in favour of my challenge to all rare spirits to isolate themselves from the mass of their fellows" (in Levy 1921, pp. 157-8). If philosophical therapeutics is centred on a concern with the healing of our own lives, 16 then in Nietzsche"s texts of his middle period, including Dawn, can be seen to be an heir to this ancient tradition. The difference is that he is developing a therapy for the sicknesses of the soul under peculiarly modern conditions of existence of social control and indoctrination. 17 Under these conditions the emphasis is to be placed for Nietzsche on the need for solitude and self-healing.
Hitherto individuals have lived in fear and as conforming herd animals; they have concealed themselves in the communal generality of the concepts "human being"
and "society". Even our distinctive sense for truth is a sense for security and is a need we share with other animals: "one doesn"t want to let oneself be deceived, be led astray by one"s actions" (D 26). In short, human existence has been constrained by its evolutionary conditions of adaptation: "everything to which we give the name Socratic virtues is bestial" (ibid.). Today the prejudice holds sway in Europe that the sympathetic affects and compassion define the moral, such as actions deemed to be congenial, disinterested, of general utility, and so on. Although Nietzsche mentions
Schopenhauer and Mill as famous teachers of this conception of morality, he holds that they merely echo doctrines that have been sprouting up in both fine and crude forms since the French Revolution (D 132). Central to modernity, as Nietzsche perceives it, is the idea that the ego must deny itself and adapt itself to the whole and as result the "individual" is debilitated and cancelled: "one never tires of enumerating and excoriating everything evil and malicious, prodigal, costly, and extravagant in the prior form of individual existence…compassion for the individual and passion for society here go hand in hand" (ibid.). Nietzsche contests the morality of self-sacrifice and looks ahead to a different morality, one that is in keeping with the spirit of the book as a whole. In contrast to a narrow, petty bourgeois morality a higher and freer manner of thinking will now look beyond the immediate consequences our actions have for others and seek to further more distant aims. Under some circumstances this will be at the expense of the suffering of others, for example, by furthering genuine knowledge: does not "free thinking" initially plunge people into doubt and distress?
In seeking victory over ourselves we need "to get beyond our compassion" (D 146;
3.138). The grief, despair, blunderings and fearful footsteps, and blunderings of individuals will form part of "a new ploughshare" that will "cleave the ground, rendering it fruitful for all…" (ibid.)
The morality that humanity has cultivated and dedicated itself to is one of "enthusiastic devotion" and "self-sacrifice" in which it looks down from sublime heights on the more sober morality of self-control (which is regarded as egotistical).
Nietzsche suggests the reason why morality has been developed in this way is owing to the enjoyment of the state of intoxication which has stemmed from the thought that the person is at one with the powerful being to whom it consecrates itself; in this way "the feeling of power" is enjoyed and is confirmed by a sacrifice of the self. For
Nietzsche, of course, such an overcoming of the "self" is impossible: "In truth you only seem to sacrifice yourselves; instead, in your thoughts you transform yourselves into gods and take pleasure in yourselves as such" (D 215; see also D 269).
In an aphorism on "pseudo-egotism" Nietzsche notes how most people live their life by doing nothing for their ego but live in accordance with the "phantom ego"
that has been formed in the opinions of those around them and is conveyed to them.
The result is that we live in a fog of impersonal or half-personal opinions and Clearly, Nietzsche is not advocating the abolition of all possible types or forms of morality. Where morality centres on "continual self-command and selfovercoming…in great things and in the smallest", Nietzsche is a champion of it (WS 45). His concern is that "morality" in the forms it has assumed in the greater part of human history, right up to Kant"s moral law, has opened up an abundance of sources of displeasure and with every refinement of morals the human being has only become more discontented with itself, its neighbour, and its lot (D 106). 18 The individual in search of happiness, and who wishes to become its own lawgiver, cannot be tended with prescriptions to the path to happiness simply because individual happiness springs from one"s own unknown laws and external prescriptions only serve to obstruct and hinder it: "The so-called "moral" precepts are, in truth, directed against individuals and are in no way aimed at promoting their happiness" (D 108). Up to now, Nietzsche notes, the moral law has been supposed to stand above our personal likes and dislikes; we did not want to impose this law upon ourselves but preferred to take it from somewhere or have it commanded to us.
Christianity has brought into the world "a completely new and unlimited imperilment", creating new securities, enjoyments, recreations, and evaluations.
Although we moderns may be in the process of emancipating ourselves from such an imperilment we keep dragging into our existence the old habits associated with these securities and evaluations, even into our noblest arts and philosophies (D 57).
Nietzsche holds that in wanting to return to the affects "in their utmost grandeur and strength" -for example, as love of God, fear of God, fanatical faith in God, and so on Nietzsche notes, quite seriously, that Christianity has wanted to free human beings from the burden of the demands of sober morality by showing a shorter way to perfection, perhaps imitating philosophers who wanted a "royal road to truth" that would avoid wearisome and tedious dialectics or the gathering of rigorously tested facts. In both cases a profound error is at work even though such an error has provided comfort to those caught exhausted and despairing in the wilderness of existence (D 59). Christianity has emerged from a "rustic rudeness" by incorporating the spirit of countless people whose need is to take joy in submission, "all those subtle and crude enthusiasts of self-mortification and other-idolization". As a result Christianity has evolved into a "very spirited religion" that has made European humanity something sharp-witted and not only theologically cunning. The creation of a mode of life which tames the beast in man, which is the noble end of Christianity, has succeeded in keeping awake "the feeling of a superhuman mission" in the soul and in the body. Here one takes pride in obeying which, Nietzsche notes, is the distinguishing mark of all aristocrats. It is with their "surpassing beauty and refinement" that the princes of the church prove to the people the church"s "truth" and which is itself the result of a harmony between figure, spirit, and task. Nietzsche then asks whether this attempt at an aristocratic harmony must also go to grave with the end of religions: "can nothing higher be attained, or even imagined?" ( What, ultimately, is it that drives Nietzsche"s project in the texts of his middle period and as we encounter it in Dawn? I believe it is the search for an authentic mode of existence. Nietzsche notes that we typically adopt the evaluations which guide our actions out of fear and only pretend that they are our own; we then grow accustomed to the pretence that this ends up being our nature. To have one"s own evaluation of things is something exceedingly rare (D 104). It is necessary to contest the idea that there is a single moral-making morality; every code of ethics that affirms itself in an exclusive manner "destroys too much valuable energy and costs humanity much too dearly" (D 164). In the future, Nietzsche hopes, the inventive and fructifying person shall no longer be sacrificed and numerous new attempts at living life and creating community shall be undertaken. When this takes place we will find that an enormous load of guilty conscience has been purged from the world.
Humanity has suffered for too long from teachers of morality who wanted too much all at once and sought to lay down precepts for everyone (D 194 ). In the future the care of truth will need to centre on the most personal questions and create time for freely taking the journey through our wastelands, quagmires, and icy glaciers. The ones who don"t take the risk of life "will never make the journey around the world (that you yourselves are!), but will remain trapped within yourselves like a knot on the log you were born to, a mere happenstance" (D 343)
IV: Nietzsche"s Search for Personality in the Late Writings
After the period of the Untimelies Nietzsche"s thinking undergoes some important transformations. Nevertheless, in spite of these changes the matrix of concepts and concerns he has set up in his Untimelies continue to be deployed in his later writings.
They become part of his mature conception of the "free spirit", a notion he already puts to work in SE (references to this notion can be found as early as 1870 in his writings), and which involves a task he incarnates and that has no-saying and yes-saying components. The "no" predominates in the late Nietzsche but he is often asking his readers to discover their "hidden yes". The problem for Nietzsche is centred on what he calls "the enigma of liberation" (HH preface) and, once again, it is a question of making oneself pure or clean. More specifically, the task is one of purifying oneself of what is chance and accident so as to make of oneself a "piece of fate", something "necessary":
One is necessary, one is a piece of fate (Verhängniss), one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole… (TI VI, 8) In the preface to the new 1886 edition of volume one of Human, all too Human,
Nietzsche writes:
This is how the free spirit gives himself an answer concerning the riddle of liberation and ends by generalizing his own case and this reaching a decision about his own experience: "What I went through, he tells himself, must be gone through by everyone in whom there is a task that wants to be embodied and "to come into the world""… (HH P 7)
This task for Nietzsche contains a "secret power and necessity", a vocation that one is destined to, without necessarily knowing this (he likens it to an unconscious pregnancy), in which it is the future that regulates one"s today. The free spirit is searching for a new problem, and a necessary part of this task is that one despises nothing, loses nothing, savours everything, and most important of all, purifies everything of its accidental elements. The central problem is now defined as one of "the order of rank", and to arrive at this as his problem Nietzsche tells us he was compelled to renounce all romantic idealism, including forbidding himself all romantic music (HH 2 P 3).
The essential character of this task is already outlined and projected in SE, and this may explain why Nietzsche continued to direct his friends to it in his late years, saying that he offered in the third and fourth Untimelies two pictures of the hardest self-discipline, of untimely types par excellence that are full of sovereign contempt.
In 1882 he presents Lou Salomé with a copy of SE saying it contains his deepest sentiments; in a letter to Georg Brandes he says that the person who does not find himself addressed personally in this work will have little to do with him. In it
Nietzsche speaks of the desire to be the "real helmsman" of our existence so that it and that music does not become an art of lying (CW 12) . What worries him is the "coincidence" of the arrival of Wagner"s music and the arrival of the "Reich":
obedience and long legs (CW 11).
In his late writings Nietzsche works with the idea that the future order of rank by which valuations of life will be made will centre on how solitary or how gregarious one is, and neither viewpoint should be evaluated from the perspective of the other. 20 His most essential recommendation is that we allow for two divergent lines of evolution to take place, one in the direction of gregariousness, the other in the direction of solitariness. The latter is required so as to help make possible genuine individuality and personality: "Nothing is rarer than a personal action. A class, a rank, a race, an environment, an accident -anything is more likely to be expressed in a work or act than is a "personality"" (KSA 12, 10 [59]; WP 886). Thus, Nietzsche is in favour of both modes of life: "To evolve further that which is typical, to make the gulf wider and wider" (ibid.). The key task should be to "establish distances, but create no antitheses (Gegensätze)" (KSA 12, 10 [63] ; WP 891). Nietzsche is allowing for the evolution of different kinds of intelligence. The first mode of intelligence is one in that is industrious, modest, inquisitive to excess, and multifarious with "a cosmopolitan chaos of affects and intelligence" ( KSA 13, 11 [31] ; WP 868). The second mode is that of a "classical taste" with a will to simplification and visible happiness and that has the courage of psychological nakedness and a will to the terrible (that is, it is not afraid to confront the terrible and ambiguous aspects of existence) (ibid). He speak of a future "sublime human being" (sublime Mensch) that has within it an abundance of difficult and rare things and that has been bred and In a note from 1880 Nietzsche recommends that an attempt be made to achieve through the individual a higher species than man: "My morality would be to take the general character of man more and more away from him…to make him to a degree non-understandable to others (and with it an object of experiences, astonishment, of instruction for them) ( KSA 9, 6 [158] ). In a note from 1881
Nietzsche expresses his admiration of the Chinese for cultivating trees that bear roses on one side and pears on the other -an exotic fruit that is the result of selective breeding indeed! (KSA 9 11 [276] ) This theme continues in the later notes, such as one from 1887 where Nietzsche demands that individuals be allowed to freely work on themselves as artist-tyrants. He adds an important qualification: "Not merely a master-race, whose task would be limited to governing, but a race or people with its own sphere of life, with an excess of strength for beauty, bravery, culture (Cultur), manners to the highest peak of the spirit; an affirming race that may grant itself every great luxury…a hothouse for strange and exquisite plants" (KSA 12, 9 [153] ; WP 898).
The concept for this non-average type of human being is "the superhuman" (KSA 12,
[17]; WP 866).
In this conception Nietzsche envisages a 'secretion of the luxury surplus of mankind' being made possible by the machinery of mankind's interests and needs becoming integrated in more and more intricate terms. On the plane of human evolution there will take place he thinks a stationary adaptation once the common management of the earth has been attained and mankind will find its ultimate meaning as a machine placed in the service of this economy. Economic and technical development will result in such an intelligent symbiosis of human and machine that the need for command and domination will become superfluous. On another plane, however, evolution can be steered in a quite different direction, away from a specialized utility and leading to the production of what he calls a 'synthetic, summarizing human'. The existence of the common stock of humanity into a machine is a precondition of the cultivation of this new higher type, and it is the production of the higher type that is able to give this maximum exploitation a meaning and legitimacy (KSA 12, 10 [17] ; WP 866). Nietzsche is thus imagining two quite different evolutions taking place: on the one hand, "minimal forces" and "minimal values"; on the other hand, a reverse movement in which a "higher form of being" flourishes. He is keen to combat the economic optimism which holds that the increasing expenditure of everyone must necessarily involve the increasing welfare of everyone. This is not so. Rather, the exploitation and expenditure of every human agent amounts to a collective loss since "man is diminished". For this not to happen the tremendous process of planetary exploitation needs to serve a new aim. Without this new goal or aim he thinks the economic and technological development of the human will amount to nothing more than a regressive phenomenon.
In his late writings, where the conception of the free spirit predominates, Nietzsche presents himself and his cure for the modern malady in terms of a variety of self-images that can be confusing: he will appear to be an Epicurean (GS 375), and he has presented humanity with such "terrible images" that any Epicurean delight is out of the question and only Dionysian joy proves sufficient (KSA 11, 25 [95] ; WP 1029).
In the essay on history Nietzsche says that today no one dares to fulfil the philosophic law in himself, that is, to live philosophically as an ancient did who declared loyalty to Stoa and lived as a Stoic wherever he was and whatever he did (UO II 5). In his late writings he refers free spirits as "we last Stoics". Nietzsche is not, of course, a Stoic and does not advocate ataraxy (GM III.25). It is a peculiar and specific commitment to Stoicism that he has. The Stoic for Nietzsche prepares himself for the worst, training himself to swallow stones and worms, slivers of glass and scorpions without nausea (GS 306). Nietzsche"s conception of fate is not the Stoic one which prepares one for "petrifaction": "We are not so badly off that we have to be as badly off as Stoics" (GS 326). Stoicism enables one to conceal well what one lacks, donning a cloak of prudent silence, affability, and mildness, and this is the cloak of the idealist who, in reality, is an incurable self-despiser and deeply vain (GS 359). Might the philosopher"s wisdom, including the Stoic"s, be a screen behind which he hides from "spirit"? (ibid) So, why does Nietzsche refer to "we last Stoics" (BGE 227)? The "last Stoic"
does not refer to the point Nietzsche makes in the essay on history lamenting the loss of a genuine commitment to philosophy but captures an important aspect of
Nietzsche"s conception of his task in his late writings, which is centred on the principal virtue that his later thinking draws upon, namely, integrity (Redlichkeit). He appeals to Stoicism in his late writings as a morality or ethical practice in which the instinct of health defends itself against incipient decadence. It is what he calls a "brake-shoe morality" that is "stoical, hard, tyrannical" (KSA 13, 15 [29] ; WP 268). It denotes a union of will (a protracted will) and knowledge, "respect for oneself" (KSA 13, 11 [297] ; WP 342; see also 11 [375] ; 427). The concern remains with the "realms of the future" but self-control is required so as to prevent clumsiness and sloppiness with regards to the tasks that face the free spirit: "We free spirits must take care that our integrity does not become our vanity, our ostentatious adornment, our limit, our stupidity!" (BGE 227)
Conclusion
In a note from 1886/7 Nietzsche stresses the importance of individuals: "My idea:
goals are lacking and these must be individuals! (Einzelne)" (KSA 12, 7 [6] , p. 281; WP 269). In another note he writes, "…what is diminishing? The will to one"s own responsibility -sign of the decline of autonomy (Autonomie)…fitness to defend oneself and bear arms, in the most intellectual matters as well -the force to command…the sense of reverence, of subordination, of being able to keep silent, great passion, the great task, tragedy, serenity" (KSA 13 Let us be under no illusion that Nietzsche reveres autonomy (its promise and its possibilities fill him with awe) and that for him the direction of life to be desired is the route or path to greater sovereignty. Consider, for example, the following:
…Here the herd instincts were decisive: nothing is as contrary to this instinct as the sovereignty of the individual (Souveränität des Einzelnen). But if the ego is conceived as something in and for itself, then its value lies in selfnegation (Selbst-Verneinung) (KSA ; 12, 10 [57], p. 487; WP 786).
For Nietzsche the sovereignty of the individual is never to be valued as something "in and for itself": it is pregnant with the future and for this to be the case it requires a specific paideia (tragic, Dionysian, etc.). This is why he is keen to expose "the false autonomy (Verselbstständigung) of the "individual" (Individuum), as atom" (ibid.).
What is to be taken to task, then, is not "autonomy" per se but "false autonomy". The following continues this line of thinking and concerns the ideas of the French philosopher Alfred Fouillée:
The "growing autonomy (Autonomie) of the individual": these Parisian philosophers such as Fouillée speak of this they ought to take a look at the race mountonnière [race of sheep] to which they belong! Open your eyes, you sociologists of the future! The individual has grown strong under opposite conditions; what you describe is the most extreme weakening and impoverishment of mankind; you even desire it and employ to that end the whole mendacious apparatus of the old ideal! You are so constituted that you actually regard your herd-animal needs as an ideal! A complete lack of psychological integrity!" (KSA 13, 11 [137] ; WP 782)
Nietzsche"s thinking on the self, as is the case with so many other topics treated by him, has highly distinctive features. However, his thinking on it is not idiosyncratic and its chief lesson is one that can continue to inspire us today, supposing we are not completely decadent and beyond the need and desire for selfredemption. It is that what makes human agency something to be valued, and something human beings have to win again and again (there are so many internal and external forces that wish to make us docile), is the capacity to be the agents of their own history and becoming, to be self-authorizers and authentic signatures. What is important to Nietzsche is that one is a personality and not "a rendezvous of persons", such as we find in the actor-type which is, in fact, a "will-less" person with virtuosity in mimicry, transfiguration, assumption of almost any desired character" (KSA 13, 16
[89]; WP 813). The task, as he repeats throughout his writings, is to become what one is and as a piece of fate, one more law, one more necessity for all that is to come and will be.
